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Describing Law 
Raff Donelson 
Legal philosophers often make bold, contentious claims about the nature of law. 
Some claim that law necessarily involves coercion, while others disagree. Some 
claim that all law enjoys presumptive moral validity, while others disagree. 
Whenever philosophers make these, and other, bold claims about law’s nature,  
I always wonder how anyone is in a position to know which one of these claims 
is true. 
Now this expression of doubt serves as an important premise in a larger 
argument. The contention here is that we should see our bold claims about law’s 
nature as practical claims, I will say ‘pragmatic claims’, and not attempts at 
description or personal expression at all. My contention, written schematically, 
is the following. 
[1] Bold claims, that is, controversial claims legal philosophers make about 
law’s nature, must be interpreted as descriptions, as expressions of a speaker’s 
non-descriptive attitudes, or as claims to be assessed on the basis of by 
practical reasons. 
[2] In interpreting bold claims, we should choose the interpretation that fares 
best along two dimensions: semantic fit and epistemic propriety. 
[3] A view that fares well along semantic fit will not attribute to a philosopher 
a judgment that the philosophy cannot plausibly be understood to make. 
[4] A view that fares well along epistemic propriety will not attribute to a phi-
losopher a claim that it would be epistemically improper for one to make. 
[5] Descriptivism,1 that is, interpreting bold claims as descriptions, fares well 
along semantic fit but poorly along epistemic propriety. 
[6] Expressivism, that is, interpreting bold claims as expressing a person’s non-
descriptive attitudes, fares poorly along semantic fit but well along episte-
mic propriety. 
[7] Pragmatism, that is, interpreting bold claims as claims to be assessed on the 
basis of practical reasons, fares well along semantic fit and well along epistemic 
propriety. 
[8] Therefore, if we are interpreting bold claims, we should choose pragmatism. 
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States Philosophical Association Conference in Lincoln, the Legal Theory Research Group in 
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1. What I mean by descriptivism bears no relation to a theory of reference. 
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About this schematic argument, a few notes are in order. Much of my paper 
concentrates on vindicating [5], but first I will write a few words about the rest. 
I do not defend [1] here, and in fact, it would be likely be impossible to show that 
these three interpretive options, viz., descriptivism, expressionism, pragmatism, 
exhaust logical space. So, I rely on a trio that captures live options in the litera-
ture. If one finds more, I will be content to have shown that pragmatism is the 
best of the three. 
[2] is concerned about semantic fit and epistemic propriety and is, I admit, 
somewhat controversial as written. It might be supposed to serve as a kind of 
principle of charity along the lines of Davidson,2 but one need not to see it 
only that way. Perhaps [2] does seem addressed to interpreting other people’s 
behavior. However, we might instead see it as the best interpretative standard 
telling us how to characterize our own legal philosophical thought. In fact, one 
can understand [2] as serving to personalize the argument and perhaps make it 
more plausible. If, for instance, we think of our own philosophical reflection in 
the descriptivist way, we should be worried about epistemic impropriety and 
thus, we might, because of [2], want to recast our own projects. 
Now [3] and [4] are just definitions. My paper concentrates on vindicating [5], 
particularly the claim about epistemic propriety. After that hurdle is surmounted, 
[6] and [7] are proved rather quickly. [8] then follows deductively. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In §1 and §2, I offer a skeptical argument. 
There, I maintain that, in order to know that a description of law is right, we 
have to be able to answer a preliminary question that we cannot answer. In §3, 
I remark upon the fact that there is an epistemic condition on making descrip-
tions. These three sections, then, amount to the claim that descriptivism is a 
poor interpretive strategy because it fails on the epistemic propriety dimension. 
In §4, I compare expressivism and pragmatism in hopes of demonstrating that 
pragmatism is, by far, the better interpretation of the two. 
1. The What-Kind Question 
In purporting to describe law, a theorist must decide early on what kind of thing 
law is. Call this the “what-kind question.”3 Specifically, a legal theorist must 
decide whether law is a social kind or an abstract kind. In what follows, I explain 
this distinction and show why deciding the what-kind question must be done and 
has to precede most other investigation. In the following section, I offer reasons 
to think that everyone lacks the epistemic resources to decide the what-kind 
question. 
2. See Donald Davidson, “Truth and Meaning” in Donald Davidson, ed, Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 1984) at 27. 
3. This is fairly similar to what Glasgow calls “the conceptual question” in philosophy of race. 
I do not call it that because, if one is not an externalist about conceptual content, it looks like 
Glasgow’s conceptual question asks after people’s thoughts. This could, in turn, bias our answer 
to the question. See Joshua Glasgow, A Theory of Race (Routledge, 2009). 
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It is a familiar thought that objects can be classified into three major categories, 
viz., natural kinds, social kinds and a third category, which one might call 
abstracta, non-natural or immaterial kinds, or Forms. This tri-partite division seems 
eminently sensible: a given object either owes its existence to a special relation to 
human attitudes or does not; if it does not, it is either physical or not. Thus, we have 
the three categories, social, natural, and abstract, respectively. To make this famil-
iar thought more perspicuous and thus theoretically useful, I stipulate a brief 
description of those objects that fall under the extension of each broad category. 
Social Kinds: that which is dependent upon human attitudes4 
Natural Kinds: that which is physical and not dependent upon human attitudes 
Abstract Kinds: that which is neither physical nor dependent upon human attitudes 
This ontological framework will be useful for our purposes if it is exhaustive 
of the kinds of objects that there are and has the epistemological consequences 
which I elaborate below. Because I developed this framework with only these 
goals in mind, the framework may be inappropriate for other theoretical purposes 
one might have. For instance, my gloss on natural kinds might be thought ‘too 
weak’ in that it does not specify what it takes for a collection to be a proper kind. 
One might complain that, on my framework, a collection of the planet Jupiter, all 
the binary star systems in the Andromeda Galaxy, and all the individual snow-
flakes atop Mont Blanc right now fall into the natural kind category.5 The sense 
that my natural kind category is too permissive stems from the fact that the term 
natural kind is often reserved for talk of those collections that play an essential 
role in our best scientific theories, participate in natural laws, and so on. 
Developing a framework so that natural kinds can play those sorts of roles is use-
ful for some theoretical purposes, such as developing a theory of reference, but 
this is not my purpose. My purpose is twofold: to suggest categories into which all 
particulars must fall and to suggest that it matters epistemically the category into 
which we place all the law particulars. My aim is not to police the boundaries of a 
proper kind. 
Let us now turn to the epistemic consequences of the framework. Natural 
kinds, of which water is a paradigm example, have particulars that are physical 
and whose existence does not depend upon human attitudes. It would seem 
that these particulars are best investigated empirically. This is not just because 
the empirical sciences have “delivered the goods,”6 as it were, with respect to 
4. There are puzzles one can raise about the dependence relation. “Doesn’t a lab-created diamond 
depend on human thoughts for its existence?” one might ask. Still, I take the distinction to be 
fairly intuitive. Little hangs on how we precisely draw the distinction between natural and 
social kinds; in fact, one could deny the distinction altogether, since all I need is a distinction 
between these and abstract kinds. 
5. Mason refers to these sorts of collections as unnatural kinds. Rebecca Mason, “The metaphysics 
of social kinds” (2016) 11:12 Philosophy Compass 841 at 842. 
6. Brian Leiter, “Objectivity, Morality, Adjudication” in Brian Leiter, ed, Naturalizing 
Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy 
(Oxford University Press, 2007) at 231. 
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investigating natural kinds, but also because it is hard to see how non-empirical 
methods could be expected to produce knowledge about these sorts of objects. 
Social kinds, of which money is a paradigm example, have particulars whose 
existence does depend in part upon human attitudes. It would seem that these 
are best investigated, in part, by probing the relevant human attitudes, which is 
also an empirical venture. Abstract kinds, of which propositions are a paradigm 
example, have particulars that are immaterial and whose characteristics, if 
discoverable at all, are discovered by a priori  reflection. 
In short, given what they are, we must investigate social kinds and abstract 
kinds differently. Knowing about those particulars under the social kind heading 
requires empirical investigation; whereas, knowing about those particulars that 
fall under the abstract kind heading requires non-empirical methods. Of course, 
this is a little too strong, for I could use an empirical method to find out about 
an abstract kind. Mathematical objects, we can assume, are abstract kinds, and 
I might interview some mathematicians to learn more about these objects. If I do 
that, I will have learned something about an abstract kind through an empirical 
method of investigation because interviewing people is a standard empirical tech-
nique. For this reason, it is not the case that every person must use non-empirical 
methods to learn about abstract kinds (or even that every person must use 
empirical methods to learn about social kinds).7 Rather, we, as an inquiring 
community, must use empirical methods to learn about social kinds and must 
use non-empirical methods to learn about abstract kinds.8 In my case about 
math, while I can defer to the mathematical experts to learn something, this 
method cannot be the sole or even primary means of learning about math, for 
someone must have begun the a priori investigation which is the precondition 
for someone having mathematical expertise. 
In this qualified way, we should accept the difference in the method of inves-
tigation for social kinds and abstract kinds, and if we do, something else follows. 
The difference in the method of investigation suggests that, in order to know 
much about something, one needs first to discover whether it is a social kind 
or an abstract kind (or a natural kind); that is, one must answer the what-kind 
question. An answer to the what-kind question then dictates the direction of 
further research. Without answering the what-kind question, it is hard to 
see how further investigation is possible. 
7. In case the reader is wondering about a case of this: I might learn something about money, 
a social kind, by determining that a set of claims about money are logically incompatible. 
Determining the logical relations between a set of propositions is a decidedly non-empirical, 
a priori affair. 
8. For disagreement on this score, see Joachim Horvath, “Conceptual analysis and natural kinds: 
the case of knowledge” (2016) 193:1 Synthese 167. He suggests that one cannot infer from 
the what-kind question to an epistemological question. He claims that one has to go through 
a semantic question, namely what-kind of concept does x name. I’m not sure if his discussion is 
limited only to natural kinds or if he thinks he is making a broader point. I tend to think that 
some of the arguments he raises, if successful, show that knowledge is not a natural kind, not 
just not a natural kind concept. 
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Putting it this way is a little too strong, for there are instances when we can 
know about something, even if we are agnostic about the kind of thing that it is. 
For instance, in moral theory, there is a dispute regarding the what-kind question 
with respect to moral properties. Some claim that moral stuffs are natural kinds9 
while others think they are abstract kinds.10 This disagreement, however, does 
not undermine our (putative) knowledge that it is morally wrong to torture pup-
pies for sport. In epistemology, we find a similar state of affairs. Some hold that 
knowledge is a natural kind,11 while most contend that it is an abstract kind, 
but still, nearly12 everyone agrees and (arguably) knows that Charles cannot 
know that he has marijuana in his car, if he does not believe he has marijuana 
in his car.13 These, then, are cases where one can have knowledge about 
something, even when no one may know the answer to the related what-kind 
question. 
These kinds of case call for me to moderate the point about the urgency of the 
what-kind question, but, for three reasons, they do not call for us to give up the 
point entirely. First, our most well-reputed and successful fields of inquiry have 
settled the what-kind question for their respective objects of inquiry, and indeed, 
this enabled their success. To see that, imagine if one of our successful fields did 
not settle the question. Imagine the state of particle physics if some physicists 
were wedded to the idea that their objects of inquiry were somehow mind-
dependent or thought they were abstract objects. When the natural-kinders 
propose building particle accelerators to try to detect subatomic particles, the 
abstract-kinders might just run a Moorean open-question argument. Knowledge 
would not advance in that setting. Second, we should still insist upon the need to 
answer the what-kind question because the ‘counterexamples’ are limited in 
number. How much can we learn about magnetism, Moldova, or modus ponens 
if we do not implicitly answer the what-kind question with respect to each? 
Third, the counterexamples can be explained away. In those cases where we can 
have knowledge about x without answering the what-kind question with respect 
to x, this owes in part to the vast agreement about the features of x. Normally, we 
do need to settle the what-kind question before any further inquiry can occur, but 
sometimes, we can bypass the question because widespread agreement provides 
evidence about the object of inquiry and may even provide some resources to 
9. See, e.g., Richard Boyd, “How to be a Moral Realist” in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed, Essays 
on Moral Realism (Cornell University Press, 1988) 181; Peter Railton, “Moral Realism” (1986) 
95:2 The Philosophical Rev 163; Nicholas Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations” in David Copp & 
David Zimmerman, eds, Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of 
Ethics (Rowman & Allanheld, 1985) 49. 
10. See, e.g., Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford University Press, 2003); 
David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism (Oxford University 
Press, 2011); Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume Two (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
11. Hilary Kornblith, Knowledge and its Place in Nature (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
12. But see Colin Radford, “Knowledge—by examples” (1966) 27:1 Analysis 1; Blake Myers-
Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel, “Knowing That P without Believing That P” (2013) 47:2 Noûs 371. 
13. This comes from a case that reached the US Courts of Appeals many years ago. United States 
v Jewell (1976), 532 F 2d 697 (9th Cir, United States) (J Kennedy, dissenting). 
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carry the inquiry forward. Of course, when the situation is otherwise, when there 
is no widespread agreement to which one can appeal, moving forward with an 
inquiry requires settling the what-kind question. 
In the case of law, answering the what-kind question looks pressing. When we 
focus on the kinds of bold claims with which I began, claims about whether law 
requires coercion or whether law requires secondary rules, we find little agree-
ment. It follows that we do need to settle the what-kind question to be in a position 
to know whether these claims accurately describe law’s nature. In the following 
section, I look at various ways that one might settle the what-kind question with 
respect to law. 
2. Methods of Deciding 
Here I consider three methods to decide the what-kind question. For each, I sug-
gest that the method does not tell in favor of any particular answer to the question. 
If this is right and if there are no alternative methods on offer, we really cannot 
make progress on downstream questions about law’s nature, and thus, we really 
do not know whether some of the ambitious claims about the nature of law are 
accurate descriptions. 
2.1 It’s Obvious 
“Isn’t it just obvious what-kind of thing law is?” This question encapsulates the 
first method I consider. When we consider most objects, we find the answer to 
the what-kind question completely obvious. For instance, I never find myself 
puzzling over whether mitochondria are abstract kinds or social kinds. It is obvi-
ous to me that, if they exist, they are natural kinds. A similar story might be told 
about arugula, black holes, and cerium. Is an answer to the what-kind question 
with respect to law just as obvious? 
Some, like Brian Leiter, seem to think so. Leiter writes, “The concept of law is 
the concept of an artefact.”14 If we can assume that all artifacts fall into the social 
kind category, then Leiter has proposed an answer to the what-kind question: 
law is a social kind. This answer is not merely the truth, contends Leiter; 
it is an obvious and uncontroversial truth. In fact, those who disagree require 
“psychological : : :  investigation,”15 or so he jests. Of course, I doubt the situation 
is so obvious. 
To be as obvious as he says, there would have to be a striking lack of contro-
versy, and pace Leiter, I do not think this exists. Leiter is surely correct that few 
openly deny that law is a social kind.16 Nonetheless, many of the jurisprudents 
14. Brian Leiter, “The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Scepticism” (2011) 
31:4 Oxford J Legal Stud 663 at 666. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid. 
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that Leiter cites as on his side (e.g. “Kelsen, Hart, Raz, Dickson and Shapiro”17) 
performatively disagree with him. Instead of focusing on any one theorist in 
particular, I note a common jurisprudential methodology employed by nearly 
all of them, a priori analysis.18 If law is a social kind, what use have we of that? 
Leiter’s answer is both simple and correct: none.19 Of course, if this is right, we 
can run a modus tollens. That is, if we do need a priori analysis, law cannot be 
a social kind. Social kinds, just to repeat the remarks from above, do not require 
a priori analysis. In fact, it seems bizarre to attempt to learn about a social kind 
primarily through a priori reflection. Consider something that is unambiguously 
a social kind such as the game of basketball. Nobody thinks that we learn much 
about basketball through a priori analysis. This is so even though one can dream 
up ‘philosophical’ questions about basketball; for instance, one can ask whether 
we could eliminate the prohibition on traveling and still have basketball.20 
Despite such possibilities, basketball is a social kind that we should investigate 
primarily with empirical methods. The same should be true of law, were it a social 
kind too. The jurisprudents who forswear empirical methods and primarily 
employ aprioristic methods are implicitly committed to seeing law as an abstract 
kind that is epistemically accessible via their aprioristic methods. This is why 
I do not take it as obvious that law is a social kind. 
Below, I consider two attempts to save the “it’s obvious” method of deciding 
the what-kind question. The first I call the Only Apparent Reply. According to 
this reply, jurisprudents’ methods are only apparently aprioristic. If the methods 
are not aprioristic, one cannot infer that jurisprudents are committed to seeing 
law as an abstract kind.21 Why might one doubt that the methods are aprior-
istic? Well, so the reply continues, jurisprudents’ reliance on intuition-pumping 
thought experiments might be thought to be an instance of conceptual analysis, 
or the analysis of some linguistic community’s understanding of a given concept. 
The jurisprudents would, on this picture, be making an empirical judgment, based 
on their own experiences.22 
The Only Apparent Reply, though ingenious, raises a question: if jurispru-
dents are trying to figure out what our shared concepts are, why should they 
perform conceptual analysis from the armchair? Going out to ask people what 
they believe or using whatever empirical methods garner esteem from the best 
social scientists—these are vastly more reliable methods. If this observation 
about reliable methods is correct, it reveals a deep problem about the Only 
Apparent Reply. Recall the dialectic. My central claim in this section is that 
legal philosophers are not in an epistemic position to describe law’s nature. 
17. Ibid. 
18. I do not, like many, call this conceptual analysis because that moniker is ambiguous. 
19. Brian Leiter, “Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis”, supra 
note 6. To be fair, I think Leiter’s real answer is “very limited.” Ibid at 133-35. 
20. James Harden seems to think so. 
21. This objection stems from a very helpful conversation with Crystal Allen-Gunasekera. 
22. For a defense of conceptual analysis that works like this, see Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics 
to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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Specifically, I am arguing that legal philosophers find themselves in this unfor-
tunate epistemic position because they cannot decide the what-kind question. 
However, it is open for me to claim, as well, that legal philosophers find them-
selves in this unfortunate epistemic position because they are using unreliable 
methods. This charge would be true if philosophers were purporting to discover 
a community’s beliefs by making educated guesses from their offices. In other 
words, the thought that jurisprudents ‘obviously’ see themselves as analyzing 
a social kind while using obviously unreliable methods for the investigation 
of social kinds makes it all the more plausible that jurisprudents are not in a 
position to accurately describe law’s nature. 
The second way of rescuing the “it’s obvious” method might contend that 
my remarks about the ubiquity of a priori analysis work all too well. Given the 
ubiquity of a priori analysis in contemporary jurisprudence, maybe it is obvious 
that law is an abstract kind, or so this suggestion goes. 
This response also fails. If many legal philosophers are committed to seeing 
law as an abstract kind while openly claiming that it is a social kind, this suggests 
that deep confusion reigns in thinking about law’s nature. Philosophers’ deep 
confusion in categorizing law as a social or abstract kind belies any claim that 
the answer to the what-kind question is obvious. 
2.2 Truisms & Desiderata 
Since the answer to the what-kind question is not obvious, we have to dig deeper, 
bring more theoretical resources to bear. We might try to answer the what-kind 
question by appealing to various uncontroversial claims about law. Call the gen-
eral method of selecting a hypothesis about x by appeal to uncontroversial claims 
about x the Truisms and Desiderata method, or just T&D.23 There are various 
ways to carry out T&D. Variation comes in determining how we come up with 
the uncontroversial claims, whether we think the correct hypothesis about law 
has to be consistent with all or most of the claims, and, if one answers ‘most’ to 
the previous question, in determining whether some subset of the claims has more 
weight than others such that it is more important for a hypothesis to accord with 
members of that subset of claims than with other members. 
T&D is widely used in philosophy.24 However, because philosophical meth-
odology is an underdeveloped area, I have yet to see a sustained conversation 
about which variant of T&D is best. Here is not the venue to begin this kind 
of conversation either. In lieu of this, I offer a few reasons for proceeding as 
I do. To find the uncontroversial claims, I asked people. I take it that philosophers 
often consult their own intuitions, but I worry that doing that can unconsciously 
23. Note that the claims are supposed to be relatively uncontroversial, not necessarily analytic or 
‘conceptual’ truths, if there are such things. 
24. For examples of its use, see Michael P Lynch, Truth as One and Many (Oxford University 
Press, 2009) (for truth); Jesse J Prinz, Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual 
Basis (MIT Press, 2002) (for concepts); Daniel M Haybron, “What Do We Want from a Theory 
of Happiness?” (2003) 34:3 Metaphilosophy 305 (for happiness). 
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stack the deck in favor of whatever hypothesis one wants. In simply asking other 
people what they think is an uncontroversial claim about law, I did nothing 
approaching the rigors of good experimental philosophy, but I hope to have 
improved upon whatever might have resulted from consulting my own idiosyn-
cratic intuitions. As to whether the best hypothesis must conform to all or most of 
the uncontroversial claims, I say ‘most.’ Like any reasonable person, I think that 
the nature of reality might be opaque to us, maybe opaque to a great many of us.25 
For that reason, we should remain open to the idea that a hypothesis about law 
can be correct even if it does not conform to everything we antecedently thought 
about law. Finally, while I do think that some of the uncontroversial statements 
about law are more core than others, we will not need decide which ones, because, 
as I argue below, the uncontroversial statements are consistent with both hypo-
theses about law, that law is a social kind, and that law is an abstract kind. If that 
is right, it shows that T&D is inadequate to solve the what-kind question. 
Consider the following list of truisms about law. 
(A) Law is a norm 
(B) Law comes from humans 
(C) Law creates some property regime 
(D) Law prohibits some killing 
(E) Law protects people 
(F) Law reflects a society’s values 
(G) Laws can be unjust 
(H) Laws can change 
(I) Laws regulate (external) behavior 
(J) Legal systems enjoy authority 
(K) Legal systems have punishment and coercion 
(L) Legal systems have some adjudication function 
(M) Legal systems must have some legitimating narrative 
I contend that each of these is consistent with thinking of law as a social kind 
or as an abstract kind. Let us consider the first few. There seems to be no clear 
winner, social kind or abstract kind, when considering (A). That law (or anything) 
is a norm does not favor either answer as some norms like etiquette are social 
kinds, while other norms, like moral norms, are arguably abstract kinds. One 
might worry that (B) cannot be squared with the thought that law is an abstract 
kind; however, consider the following about numbers. Surely, the Arabic base-10 
number system came from humans, but that does not mean that arithmetic 
depends, in any interesting way, on humans. A similar story might be offered for 
the case of law. For (C), (D), (F), (G), and (I) these are just claims about the 
content of law, and it would seem that these sorts of content claims do not favor 
a particular answer to the what-kind question. 
25. Note that this is not yet a commitment to metaphysical realism. I only said that reality might be 
opaque, that is, unknown to us, not that reality might be unknowable to us. The latter claim, not 
the former, expresses metaphysical realism. 
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I skipped over (E), which initially seems hard to square with the idea that law 
is an abstract kind. (E) looks hard to square because it attributes causal power to 
law, but abstract kinds, qua non-natural stuffs, are not thought to have causal 
efficacy at all. One option for the abstract kinder is to go full-blown Platonist 
and to insist that abstract kinds, despite being non-natural, do have causal effi-
cacy.26 A more promising option for the abstract kind advocate is to note that it is 
debatable whether law itself causes anything. It is, therefore, far less contentious 
to maintain that certain widespread attitudes toward law cause (or constitute) 
safety. Putting it this way enables the abstract kinder to capture the flavor of 
(E) in a different way. Instead of claiming that law itself protects people, maybe 
one could claim (E*). 
(E*) A condition of general obedience to law is (often27) safer than its opposite. 
(E*) avoids the strange causal attribution and is thereby more plausible than 
(E). I take it that (E*) captures the spirit of (E) because it still countenances the 
familiar notion, traceable to Hobbes,28 that living under a legal system promises 
greater physical safety to average persons than they would enjoy, absent a legal 
system. (E*) should, thus, replace (E) on our list. When it does, we see that there 
is no problem for the abstract kind advocate because (E*) is equally compatible 
with law as an abstract kind or a social kind.29 
(H) is another statement that looks like a trouble spot for the abstract kind 
advocate because abstract kinds are classically conceived as changeless.30 One 
could abandon the thought that all abstract kinds are changeless. If, however, 
the abstract kind advocate wanted to pursue a less controversial strategy, one 
might understand legal change as a change in the applicability of a given legal 
norm. The abstract kind advocate can thus account for legal change while 
maintaining that law, in a certain sense, is changeless. The remaining question 
is whether something is lost in speaking this way as opposed to the way from 
(H). I doubt this, and if I am right, (H) is another truism that is equally compatible 
with thinking of law as a social kind or an abstract kind. 
I leave the task of determining how the rest of the truisms fare to the reader. 
The foregoing has made it all but undeniable that the above set of truisms is con-
sistent with both answers to the what-kind question. One more thing should be 
said before concluding this section. It might be held that, while one cannot solve 
26. Plato famously held abstract kinds were causally efficacious; one can see this view on offer in 
works like the Phaedo, the Timaeus, and the Sophist. For a contemporary argument defending 
that view, see Fiona Leigh, “Restless Forms and Changeless Causes” (2012) 112:2 Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society 239. 
27. Clearly, sometimes disobedience will make people safer. Disobeying, for instance, the American 
Fugitive Slave Act, made people safer than obedience. 
28. Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan” in Edwin A Burtt, ed, The English Philosophers from Bacon to 
Mill: The Golden Age of English Philosophy (Random House, 1939). 
29. I thank Ken Himma for valuable discussion on the topics of this paragraph. 
30. Plato maintains this; see Plato, “Phaedo” translated by Hugh Tredennick in Edith Hamilton & 
Huntington Cairns, eds, Plato: The Collected Dialogues (Princeton University Press, 1961) at 78d. 
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the what-kind question by appealing to the truisms, one can settle other questions 
about law’s nature by reference to these same truisms. In other words, this 
challenge asks whether T&D itself is a way to circumvent the what-kind question 
and to directly answer the skeptical challenge I raise. The short answer: probably 
not. If there were a straightforward set of inferences from truisms to controversial 
conclusions about law’s nature, the debates mentioned at the outset of the paper 
would not persist.31 
2.3 Appeals to Simplicity and Naturalism 
It might seem that one could easily answer the what-kind question by just de-
nying that there are abstract kinds in the first place. If there are no abstract kinds, 
a fortiori, law is not one; if law is not an abstract kind, it is a social kind—or so 
an argument might go.32 A concern for ontological simplicity and a thorough-
going naturalism would motivate the first antecedent and thus carry us to the 
claim that law had better be a social kind. Is there anything to be said to block 
this strategy? 
I have nothing general to say about the viability of thoroughgoing naturalism 
of this sort, so my response will not take a position on the existence of abstract 
kinds. Instead, I question the inference from “there are no abstract kinds” to “law 
is a social kind.” To see the problem with this inference pattern, consider a dif-
ferent case. Consider what thoroughgoing physicalists might say about numbers.33 
They would deny that numbers are abstract kinds, but they might insist that 
numbers, were they to exist, would be abstract kinds. Accordingly, they might 
strongly deny that numbers are social or natural kinds; instead, they would 
contend that numbers do not exist at all. The numbers case shows that mere 
skepticism about abstract kinds is not enough to establish that something, 
thought to be an abstract kind, must fall into some other category of kinds. 
Eliminativism is a viable strategy too.34 
31. There is a similar way that one might try to circumvent the what-kind question and similar 
response to that plan. One might think that there are bold claims that are vindicated on either 
answer to the what-kind question, and one might take this as evidence that one can skip 
answering that question. Again, if there were some straightforward way to show that, whether 
law is investigable by empirical or aprioristic means, p is true about law, it is hard to see how 
p could be controversial and thus qualify as a bold claim. Instead, p is likely to be one of 
the truisms. I thank Euan MacDonald for pressing this worry. 
32. For those who worry that I put an obviously invalid argument in the mouth of an interlocutor, 
I am aware that the argument as stated is technically invalid. There is a suppressed premise 
here, that law is an abstract kind or a social kind. Once that is in place, the argument is not 
obviously invalid. 
33. Hartry Field, Science Without Numbers (Princeton University Press, 1980). 
34. I do not use eliminativism in the same sense as Liam Murphy, What Makes Law: An Introduction 
to  the Philosophy of Law  (Cambridge University Press, 2014). There, Murphy means refusing 
to talk about law. Instead, I mean the metaphysical thesis that “law” has no referent. For a 
careful discussion of “eliminativism” in jurisprudence, see Hillary Nye, “Does Law Exist?” 
[forthcoming]. 
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To return to thinking about law, naturalism is not enough to show that law 
must be a social kind, for the very same naturalism licenses us to be eliminativists 
about law. To round out the argument, then, more would have to be done to 
explain why we should think of law as a social kind as opposed to advocating 
for eliminativism about law. Without this work done, there is no easy way to 
resolve the what-kind question and thus we cannot know much about law’s nature. 
Of course, it might be doubted whether eliminativism really is a reasonable 
option. Let me elucidate this doubt before explaining where it goes wrong. The 
person who worries about eliminativism might begin by noting that it surely 
seems as if law structures a good bit of our reality. Therefore, it seems like, if 
we are sure of anything, we are sure that there is law. Any argument purporting 
that there is no law is on shakier ground than one contending that there is law. 
I can begin to diffuse this sort of worry by mentioning an analogous case in the 
philosophy of race. This is a debate about whether race is a natural kind or social 
kind.35 Some people in this debate think that race is the kind of thing that, if it 
existed, it would be a natural kind, just given how we think of it. These same 
people, however, doubt that race exists; they are eliminativists about race. Thus, 
racial eliminativists can wholly agree that “Race has profoundly shaped life in the 
Americas and elsewhere from 1600 onward,” but they think such sentences are 
actually loose talk. Technically speaking, race has not shaped anything because it 
does not exist, but false beliefs—that there are races and that members of these 
races have particular characteristics—those have profoundly shaped life. 
This example about race goes to show that eliminativism even about some-
thing that appears to have left an indelible mark upon the world can be made 
plausible. Perhaps the same might be true of eliminativism about law. Here is 
not the place to substantiate the claim. All I contend here is that eliminativism 
is a viable strategy, and if it is viable, naturalism alone is not sufficient grounds 
for concluding that law is a social kind. There needs to be an independent argu-
ment for explaining why naturalism should not lead us to thinking that there is no 
such thing as law, after all. Until such an argument is furnished, we cannot know 
much about law’s nature because we cannot answer the what-kind question. 
Before concluding this section, I raise and respond to one last attempt to show 
that eliminativism about law is non-viable. I consider this attempt simply because 
it is suggested by our conversation thus far. One might think the list of truisms 
itself provides ample evidence that eliminativism cannot be true. How could law 
have any of the characteristics in (A)-(M), if it does not exist? Here is the very 
beginning of a response. Perhaps, the eliminativist can assent to all of these 
truisms by replacing law itself with false beliefs people have about law. For 
instance, consider (E*), which claims that a condition of general obedience to law 
is often safer than its opposite. The eliminativist can claim, 
35. For a helpful overview of the debate, see generally, Charles Mills, “Critical Philosophy of 
Race” in Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabo´ Gendler, & John Hawthorne, eds, Oxford Handbook 
of Philosophical Methodology (Oxford University Press, 2016) 709. 
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(E**) A condition of general obedience to what people believe to be law is often 
safer than its opposite. 
(E**) preserves the general notion underlying both (E) and (E*), and (E**) 
might be thought to be more explanatory than either of these since it tries to 
explain intentional actions via people’s mental states, not through external stimuli 
alone. This response, to be clear, is not a vindication of eliminativism, but it 
gestures at the sort of strategy eliminativists can employ. If that type of strategy 
succeeds, it proves that naturalism and simplicity concerns do not show that law 
must be a social kind. Law could be the kind of thing that, if it existed, it would 
be an abstract kind, but as it happens, law does not exist since there are no 
abstract kinds. 
Finally, the eliminativist strategy that I have outlined not only shows that 
the naturalist cannot quickly conclude that law is a social kind; it also presents 
another reason to worry about our ability to describe law’s nature. One does not 
only need to settle the what-kind question, one also needs to show that law exists 
in the first place. 
3. Descriptivism Rebutted 
Having shown the great difficulty jurisprudents face in answering the what-kind 
question and demonstrated the skeptical upshot of this for the project of describ-
ing law’s nature, now, we can move to the next phase of the argument. Here, 
I explain why the skeptical upshot has repercussions for the descriptivist inter-
pretation of jurisprudential discourse. 
Descriptivism, as I understand the term here, is an interpretive strategy for 
understanding a particular domain of discourse, and it has two components, 
a semantic component and a normative component. According to the semantic 
component, to be a descriptivist about a discourse D means to think that sentences 
in D36 are propositions, propositions that refer to entities and properties that the 
surface grammar of the sentence indicates. In short, to be a descriptivist about 
D is to be a cognitivist about the semantics of D-sentences. According to the nor-
mative component, to be a descriptivist about D means to think that those who 
assert D-sentences err insofar as they would be epistemically unjustified in hold-
ing that those D-sentences name states of affairs which obtain. In short, to be a 
descriptivist is to think that a “robustly epistemic”37 norm governs D-sentences. 
I put this vaguely because there is no need to precisify the specific epistemic norm 
which descriptivism requires. It could be the popular Knowledge Norm of 
Assertion, which claims that one should assert p only if one knows that p.38 
36. Hereafter, I call sentences in D “D-sentences”. 
37. This phrase is borrowed from Sanford G Goldberg, Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance 
of Assertoric Speech (Oxford University Press, 2015) at ix. 
38. Famous advocates of this view include Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, 
Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Harvard University Press, 1994); Keith DeRose, 
“Assertion, knowledge, and context” (2002) 111:2 The Philosophical Rev 167; Elizabeth Fricker, 
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Alternatively, it could be something less demanding like Jennifer Lackey’s 
Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion, which claims that one “should assert 
that p only if (i) it is reasonable for one to believe that p, and (ii) if one asserted 
that p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to 
believe that p.”39 
This stipulated definition of descriptivism as an interpretive strategy aims to 
capture the intuitive notion of what it is like to understand someone as trying 
to describe something. When we understand someone as trying to describe some-
thing, we see them as saying something about the world, something that could be 
accurate of the world or not. Also, when reading someone as trying to describe 
something, we think the person is criticizable if that person has been epistemi-
cally irresponsible in offering something as a description. 
Having explained descriptivism generally, it should be plain what a descrip-
tivist interpretation of jurisprudential conversations involves. It should also be 
plain that a descriptivist interpretation is, by far, the most natural reading of 
such discourse. And it should also be plain that descriptivism suffers as an inter-
pretation of jurisprudential discourse. While descriptivism does well in terms of 
glossing the semantics, it fails on the normative side because of the epistemic 
problems that attend trying to describe law’s nature, as I demonstrated in the 
previous section. Why, one might ask, does a good interpretation have to mini-
mize normative errors, as I have suggested? 
In choosing an interpretation of jurisprudential discourse (or any other 
practice), we should be wary of those interpretations that suggest participants 
are routinely not following the rules, especially if, on another interpretation, 
participants are great at following rules, just different rules for a slightly different 
practice. This interpretive principle is a version of Donald Davidson’s principle 
of charity. For Davidson, employing the principle of charity is a precondition for 
interpreting anyone at all. One might embrace the principle on that basis; the 
thought would be that the principle of charity is non-optional. There is another, 
less ambitious reason for adhering to the principle of charity. Unless we adopt 
this principle, that is, unless we see participants’ behavior as largely correct, 
we cannot see the practice (as practiced) as worth salvaging. In the abstract, this 
consideration may not seem important, but when the practice is one to which we, 
ourselves, are deeply committed, it is obviously important to see our own favored 
practices as worthwhile. Thus, if we can help it, we should not see ourselves as 
engaged in a practice for which we all regularly flout the internal norms. 
“Second-Hand Knowledge” (2006) 73:3 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 592; 
John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford University Press, 2003); Jason Stanley, 
Knowledge and Practical Interests (Oxford University Press, 2005); John Turri, “Knowledge 
and the Norm of Assertion: A Simple Test” (2015) 192:2 Synthese 385; Peter Unger, Ignorance: 
A Case for Scepticism (Oxford University Press, 1975); and Timothy Williamson, Knowledge 
and its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
39. Jennifer Lackey, “Norms of Assertion” (2007) 41:4 Noûs 594 at 609. 
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4. Two Non-Descriptive Reads 
At this point, I have shown that, if jurisprudents continue making bold claims 
about law’s nature, we should not see them as making descriptive claims, lest 
we attribute to them epistemic error. Another way of putting the point: if we, 
ourselves, have been making bold claims about law’s nature, we must re-cast 
these claims as something other than description. 
In this final substantive section of the paper, I turn to discussing two alter-
native ways we might understand claims about law’s nature. Though there are 
other logically possible options, there are really two main contenders. The most 
familiar non-descriptive way to understand claims is in an expressivist manner, 
that is, to see the relevant claims as expressions of conative states such as desires40 
or commitment to plans.41 Expressivism has a long and illustrious history in moral 
theory,42 and it has begun to surface in jurisprudential discussion as well.43 For 
reasons I discuss below, an expressivist take on debates in jurisprudence presents 
difficulties. Given those difficulties, I advocate for a pragmatist understanding 
of claims about law’s nature. On a pragmatist read, jurisprudential claims are 
suggestions about how to view law, suggestions that are to be assessed on the 
basis of practical reasons. 
4.1 Expressivism—Boo! 
Many views go under the heading of expressivism,44 and many figures call them-
selves expressivist. Consequently, it is hard to say much about expressivism with-
out becoming mired in exegesis and making qualifications. Here is not the place 
for that work, so instead, I stipulate a definition of expressivism below and try to 
show that it does not name a promising alternative to thinking of jurisprudential 
claims as descriptions. 
To give an expressivist understanding of a person’s judgment is to see the 
judgment as primarily functioning to express a non-descriptive attitude of the 
40. For this kind of development in moral theory, see Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism 
(Oxford University Press, 1993). 
41. For this kind of development in moral theory, see Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live 
(Harvard University Press, 2003). 
42. AJ Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (Penguin, 1946); RM Hare, The Language of Morals 
(Oxford University Press, 1952); Charles Stevenson, Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical 
Analysis (Yale University Press, 1963). 
43. See Kevin Toh, “Hart’s Expressivism and His Benthamite Project” (2005) 11:2 Legal 
Theory 77. To be clear, Toh offers an expressivist reading on first-order claims about 
law, not second-order (or theoretical) claims about law. To illustrate the difference, the 
‘first-order expressivist’ gives an expressivist take on a sentence like “Public urination is 
illegal in this jurisdiction,” while the ‘second-order expressivist’ gives an expressivist take 
on a sentence like “Illegality consists in whatever a court is likely to condemn with 
sanctions.” 
44. Projectivism, emotivism, prescriptivism, quasi-realism, non-cognitivism—these are just some 
examples. 
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person45 and not to describe the state of affairs indicated by the surface grammar 
of the judgment. Consider a simple example. Suppose I were to judge that 
Riesling is good. On an expressivist understanding, that judgment primarily func-
tions to express one of my non-descriptive attitudes, perhaps my warm feelings 
toward Riesling, my plan to drink Riesling in such-and-so circumstances, or my 
desire for others to drink Riesling. On any expressivist understanding, the judg-
ment certainly does not primarily function to describe Riesling or to link it with 
the property of goodness (or the properties that constitute goodness-for-Riesling). 
Expressivism is not a theory or interpretative strategy for one-off judgments. 
Instead, it is used for entire domains of discourse. Though it is most common 
to be expressivist about moral discourse, one might employ that strategy for 
theological discourse,46 logic,47 or even globally. I mention expressivism’s 
generality because sometimes the right way to understand a speaker’s statement, 
despite the surface grammar, is as an expression of something about that person. 
For instance, if someone pours a glass of Riesling in my presence but does not 
offer me any, I might say, “Riesling sure is delicious.” In this case, a hearer might 
rightly understand my statement to express my desire to drink a glass of Riesling, 
but this alone does not render the hearer an expressivist. If the hearer held that 
all aesthetic language were expressive and not descriptive, this would amount 
to expressivism. Expressivism does not concern what is implicated48 by a given 
statement; indeed, it is semantic theory about certain kinds of discourse. 
45. This is supposed to be broad enough to include views on which the discourse in question 
is thought to express speaker suggestions meant to influence the affective faculties of the 
listener, such as Isenberg. See Arnold Isenberg, “Critical Communication” (1949) 58:4 The 
Philosophical Rev 330. One might then wonder about the difference between an expressivist 
interpretation of jurisprudential discourse, which makes suggestions to the listeners about how 
to think about something, and a pragmatist interpretation on which jurisprudential discourse 
offers claims about how to think about something, claims that are to be adjudicated on the basis 
of practical reasons. The difference lies in the semantic glosses each theory has. The expressivist 
is offering a picture of the semantics of jurisprudential discourse; whereas, the pragmatist offers 
no picture of the semantics, just a picture of the norms by which one judges the correctness of 
jurisprudential discourse. I thank Mary Sirridge for helpful feedback on this point. 
46. RB Braithwaite, An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief (Cambridge University 
Press, 1955). 
47. Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism (Harvard University 
Press, 2000). 
48. I use implicated in the sense of a Gricean implicatures, not a logical implication or a logical 
entailment. See generally, Paul Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Harvard University Press, 
1989). What is implicated (in this sense) differs from what is logically entailed. For instance, if 
I say, “I have a doctoral degree,” that (Gricean) implicates that I have only one doctoral degree. 
However, that is not logically entailed by the prior statement. “I have a doctoral degree” entails 
that I have at least one. If I have two doctoral degrees, saying that I have one is not false. 
I mention this all in order to prevent a certain misunderstanding. To see the possible misun-
derstanding, consider the fact that paying a compliment in a certain setting can implicate that 
one has a desire with respect to the object of the compliment. For instance, “That Riesling 
smells wonderful” may implicate that the speaker desires to drink Riesling. The existence of 
implicatures may make it seem as if the compliment expresses a desire in the sense meant by 
expressivists. It does not because what is implicated by a statement differs from the statement 
itself and its logical entailments. Expressivists aim to gloss the statement itself and its 
entailments. 
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Having offered a characterization of expressivism, now let us turn to explain-
ing how an expressivist read of jurisprudential language avoids the problems of 
descriptivism with respect to law’s nature. If in judging that, for instance, coer-
cion is central to law’s nature, theorists are not trying to describe law but rather 
trying to express a desire or some other non-descriptive attitude of theirs, it does 
not matter that a theorist does not know much about law’s nature. The epistemic 
failing that one would make, were one engaged in an act of description, is simply 
not attributable to her. Thus, expressivism is a semantic escape route if we want 
to continue making claims about law’s nature. 
As a semantic theory, expressivism has been prey to much criticism. Here, 
I mention just three worries. None of these criticisms is new, and none of them 
may ultimately prove devastating, but these are reasons to prefer an interpretative 
strategy that, all else equal, does not incur these problems. As I argue in the 
next section, pragmatism is such a theory. For now, I turn to the criticisms of 
expressivism. 
The first worry, a problem for any kind of expressivism, is how to make 
the relevant judgments, when construed expressivistically, act as truthbearers.49 
This worry is best seen by considering a simple example. Suppose the judgment 
“The norm L is a law” is construed expressivistically such that the judgment 
expresses the judger’s plan to follow L. If this is how the judgment is to be con-
strued, it seems rather obvious that the judgment is neither true nor false, since 
plans are neither true nor false. Plans might be well- or ill-conceived; they may 
rely on falsehood, which could make them ill-conceived, but, strictly speaking, 
they cannot be true or false. Plans are not truthbearers and do not act as such. This 
is not yet a problem. The problem emerges when one notes that some of the 
judgments that expressivists have read expressivistically do act as truthbearers, 
such that one might infer that the expressivists are wrong in interpreting the 
judgments as they have. The most famous instance of this kind of problem is 
the Frege-Geach Problem.50 Here is an instance of a Frege-Geach Problem, using 
our simple example. 
Premise 1: L is a law or 22=5 
Premise 2: It is not the case that 22=5 
Conclusion: L is a law 
This looks like a good inference, but it is not clear how it could be so, if we un-
derstand “L is a law” in the expressivist way. The argument above looks like an 
instance of the following schema. 
Premise 1`: p or q 
Premise 2`: Not-q 
Conclusion`: p 
49. For readers less familiar with the philosophy of language, a truthbearer is something that could 
be true such as a belief, a proposition, or a declarative sentence. 
50. For its first clear articulation, see Peter Geach, “Assertion” (1965) 74:4 Philosophical Rev 
449 at 463. 
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But it is not. “L is a law” is not a truthbearer; it is a plan. As a plan, it cannot be 
plugged into a slot where only a truthbearer can go. This particular version of 
the Frege-Geach problem is known in the literature as an embedding problem. 
There are other problems associated with making expressivistically-understood 
judgments act as truthbearers. These include problems about negation and 
contradiction. There are proposed solutions for the different facets of this general 
problem (and rebuttals), but here is not the place for probing. My aim is not 
to disprove expressivism but rather to saddle it with problems that my preferred 
theory does not face. 
The second problem with expressivism is what I call the Massive Error Theory 
Problem.51 Again, I refer to our simple example to illustrate this. If the average 
legal theorist, much less the average person, says, “L is a law,” one likely takes 
oneself to say something about law, not to express one’s own plans. To interpret 
this judgment expressivistically is to claim that the average person who makes 
such judgments is in deep error about one’s own thoughts. It is a general principle 
within philosophy to regard massive error theories with suspicion because our 
consensus in favor of the relevant beliefs, our successful navigation of the world 
using those beliefs, and other things besides are all evidence counting in favor 
of the beliefs. Of course, error theories are not always wrong, so it is not exactly 
a criticism to mention that expressivism involves an error theory. The criticism 
comes in thinking about the scale of this particular error theory versus its payoff. 
If the expressivist suggestion is to view ordinary claims about law’s nature 
as expressing a theorist’s conative states, we get a situation where nearly every 
jurisprudent in the world is deeply mistaken about thoughts in that person’s own  
head. That is the scale. What is the payoff? The payoff is that now we do not view 
every jurisprudent as making a different systematic epistemic error. This payoff 
just swaps one large error for another. If a theory could have this same payoff 
with a smaller error theory, it would be an advantage.52 
The third and final problem I address focuses specifically on expressivism 
with respect to claims about law’s nature. This problem has analogues elsewhere 
but is particularly pressing in this domain. What is the specific attitude that claims 
about law’s nature should be thought to express? The suggestions of early ethical 
expressivists are clearly inadequate to the task. Claims about the centrality of 
coercion to law do not seem like saying “Coercion, boo!” or “Coercion, rah!” 
Something more sophisticated is being said, but what? In ethical discourse, 
51. For others who have also raised this sort of problem for moral expressivism, see Jonas Olson, 
“The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It” (2010) 23:1 Ratio 87; 
Terrence Cuneo, “Saying what we Mean: An Argument against Expressivism” in Russ Shafer-
Landau, ed, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol 1 (Oxford University Press, 2006) 35. 
52. One might think that content and semantic externalists—that is, those who claim that meaning 
of our thoughts and words are determined by things outside of own minds—should have no 
problem with a massive error theory of just the kind I mention. Such externalists admit that we 
may not know what’s going on in our own heads; however, I take it that such externalists admit 
that this is a cost of their view, albeit a cost happily borne given its theoretical payoffs, such as 
explaining reference success and failure in intuitive cases. If there were no such payoffs, such 
externalism would (and should!) have few friends. 
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connecting ethical judgment to a certain set of conative states (e.g. desiring, plan-
ning to live a life in a certain way, or commanding others to behave in a certain 
manner) has a kind of intuitive appeal because doing so can explain ethical 
motivation. No analogue is present in the case of jurisprudential language; thus, 
it is hard to know where to start. I leave it as a standing challenge for the expres-
sivist to explain which attitudes are being expressed by jurisprudential language, 
given that really simple answers look implausible and that motivation provides 
no helpful theoretical starting point. 
4.2 In Praise of Pragmatism 
An inability to answer the what-kind question led us away from seeing claims 
about law’s nature as descriptions; the three worries raised in the last section 
led us from seeing claims about law’s nature as non-cognitive expressions of 
the person making the claim. Here I offer a new way to see claims about law’s 
nature, a pragmatist way. 
It is an old saw to note that pragmatism can be understood in various ways.53 
At the outset of this article, I offered a specific stipulation of the term. A prag-
matist interpretation of jurisprudential discourse contends that jurisprudential 
discourse, including the bold claims, are claims to be adjudicated by practical 
reasons. Before explaining why this interpretation is to be preferred to the descrip-
tivist and expressivist interpretations, it may help to compare my stipulative 
understanding of pragmatism to other, perhaps more familiar, understandings. 
This comparative, expository work will facilitate the persuasive work ahead. 
What I mean by pragmatism bears little relation to the pragmatist theory of 
truth, most often associated with the term. The question here has all along been 
about interpretation—how we ought to interpret claims about the nature of law. 
The pragmatist theory of truth offers conditions under which a truthbearer, such 
as a proposition, is true. A well-known slogan provides those conditions: “truth is 
what works.”54 If we wish to make that idea more specific and manageable, one 
might claim that, on this theory, p is true if and only if believing that p is optimific 
or resolves doubt. However, I reject the pragmatist theory of truth, which is in 
keeping with several notable pragmatists. The present effort simply does not con-
cern the metaphysics of truth. 
53. See Arthur Lovejoy, “The Thirteen Pragmatisms I” (1908) 5:1 J Philosophy, Psychology and 
Scientific Methods 5 [Lovejoy, “The Thirteen Pragmatisms I”]; Arthur Lovejoy, “The Thirteen 
Pragmatisms II” (1908) 5:2 J Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 29. 
54. Many attribute this to William James; see, e.g., Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy 
(Simon & Schuster, 1945). However, James attributed this to FCS Schiller: William James, 
“Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth” in Louis Menand, ed, Pragmatism: A Reader (Vintage, 
1997) at 130. Meanwhile, Schiller denied the adage: see FCS Schiller, “Why Humanism?” 
in John R Shook & Hugh P MacDonald, eds, FCS Schiller on Pragmatism and Humanism: 
Selected Writings, 1891-1939 (Humanity Books, 2008) at 100; FCS Schiller, “The Humanist 
Theory of Truth”, ibid at 530. And funny enough, Hilary Putnam denies that James held the 
view: see Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism: An Open Question (Blackwell, 1995) at 8-9. 
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Historically, pragmatism also has been thought “a doctrine concerning the 
meaning of propositions.”55 This is closer to my project. Pragmatism as a theory 
of meaning has a variety of iterations. On one iteration, the meaning of p is 
determined by the set of consequences an agent expects upon believing that p. 
On another iteration, the meaning of p is determined by the ways that an agent 
uses p. There are, no doubt, various critiques one might raise to both of these, but 
since my goal is to distinguish my version of pragmatism, not to disparage others, 
I forgo any reproof. How similar is my project to either version of meaning-
pragmatism? While my pragmatism concerns interpreting jurisprudential dis-
course, it is not a theory of meaning. I do not claim that jurisprudential 
judgments mean this or that; instead, I offer a norm by which to assess them. 
(Of course, the judgments have to mean something so that they can be assessed, 
but the pragmatism on offer here does not provide that. More on this in a 
moment!) 
Some pragmatists have been very clear that they are not offering theories 
about the metaphysics of truth or semantic theories; instead, they claim to offer 
a metaphilosophical view about how inquiry is to be conducted. Such “inquiry-
pragmatists” argue that we ought to assess claims by the practical consequences 
of believing them or accepting56 them. To fix ideas, consider the famous passage 
in Pascal’s Pensées where he argues for the claim “God exists” on the basis of 
an argument about the expected utility of believing that God exists.57 Pascal does 
not claim that God’s existence depends on the expected utility calculation; Pascal 
does not even say (à la  the pragmatist theory of truth) that the truth of “God’s 
exists” depends on the expected utility calculation. Instead, the claim is that the 
norm for settling the question of whether God exists is expected utility. What I am 
calling an inquiry-pragmatist approves of this way of assessing claims. Of course, 
individual pragmatists within this type might disagree with utility as the proper 
criterion of assessment, but all such pragmatists will urge using practical norms 
to decide the given questions. 
Pragmatism as a norm of inquiry is identical to the view I advocate here. 
Admittedly, my advocacy has been oblique. The question I have asked is how 
jurisprudential discourse is to be interpreted, and I am in the course of arguing 
that we should select the pragmatist interpretation. By the pragmatist interpreta-
tion, I have meant that we should see jurisprudential claims as claims to be ad-
judicated by practical reasons. This should already make the connection between 
my view and inquiry-pragmatism close, but consider another fact. Jurisprudence 
is a field of inquiry. Thus, I am advocating that, for a specific field of inquiry, 
claims made within that field should be assessed by practical reasons. 
55. Lovejoy, “The Thirteen Pragmatisms I”, supra note 53 at 6. 
56. I follow Cohen in defining acceptance as the following: “to accept that p is to have or adopt a 
policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that p that is, of going along with that proposition 
(either for the long term or for immediate purposes only) as a premise in some or all contexts 
for one’s own and others’ proofs, argumentations, inferences, deliberations, etc.” Jonathan 
Cohen, “Belief and Acceptance” (1989) 98:391 Mind 367 at 368. 
57. Blaise Pascal, Pascal’s Pensées, edited and translated by WF Trotter (EP Dutton, 1958). 
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As the previous point makes clear, inquiry-pragmatism can be limited to a 
specific domain of discourse. One need not adopt a global version of it. One could, 
as I have, advocate for pragmatism for reasons that are specific to a domain. 
I make one last expository point. I am far from the first person to argue very 
explicitly that jurisprudential claims should be assessed by practical criteria. 
One of the first was Liam Murphy.58 Other advocates include Natalie Stoljar59 
and Juan Carlos Bayo´n.60 Ronald Dworkin’s views in jurisprudence bear some 
resemblance to my own, especially insofar as we both take issue with jurispru-
dence as a quest to describe the nature of law.61 However, assessing the closeness 
of the positions is a tough exegetical task best left for another day.62 
Having offered a characterization of pragmatism, now let us turn to explaining 
how a pragmatist reading of jurisprudential language avoids the problems of 
descriptivism with respect to law’s nature. For the pragmatist, a theorist is not 
answerable to the same norms as one would be when engaged in description. 
Thus, for the pragmatist, the mere fact that one does not meet the epistemic 
norms internal to description is no problem. It is as if one’s journey is guided 
by a different treasure map, so the fact that one cannot reach the descriptivist’s 
destination is irrelevant. It is important to stress that, unlike the expressivist, the 
pragmatist has no metaphysical story about why norms of description do not 
apply to jurisprudential language. The expressivist has a semantic theory about 
particular judgments: such judgments have different contents than what the 
descriptivist claims, and that is why the norms of description fail to apply. The 
pragmatist is quietist about the semantics.63 The pragmatist can say that the judg-
ments are not descriptions, but all that amounts to is a normative claim, namely 
a denial that the norms of description apply. Thus, pragmatism is a normative 
escape route if we want to continue making claims about law’s nature.  
Between pragmatism and expressivism, pragmatism is the preferable alter-
native to descriptivism about jurisprudential language because the three main 
problems for expressivism are largely absent. The first problem, the problem 
of getting the content to behave as truthbearers despite not being truthbearers, 
does not arise for pragmatism. Since pragmatism offers no semantic claim, there 
is no worry about getting it wrong. Pragmatists can help themselves to whatever 
58. See Liam Murphy, “The Political Question of the Concept of Law” in Jules Coleman, ed, 
Hart’s Postscript (Oxford University Press, 2001) 371; Liam Murphy, “Concepts of Law” 
(2005) 30:1 Australian J Leg Philosophy 1. 
59. See Natalie Stoljar, “In Praise of Wishful Thinking: A Critique of Descriptive/Explanatory 
Theories of Law” (2012) 6 Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 51; Natalie 
Stoljar, “What Do We Want Law to Be? Philosophical Analysis and the Concept of Law” in 
Wilfrid Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa, eds, Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2013) 230. 
60. Juan Carlos Bayo´n, “The Province of Jurisprudence Underdetermined” in Jordi Ferrer Beltrán, 
José Juan Moreso & Diego M Papayannis, eds, Neutrality and Theory of Law (Springer, 2013) 1. 
61. Hillary Nye, “Staying Busy While Doing Nothing? Dworkin’s Complicated Relationship with 
Pragmatism” (2016) 29:1 Can JL & Jur 71 at 90. 
62. For the suggestion that Dworkin and Murphy (and by substitution, myself) have different 
views, see Julie Dickson, “Methodology in Jurisprudence” (2004) 10:3 Legal Theory 117. 
63. Though, for the reasons cited in section 4.1, it might be best if the pragmatist agreed with the 
descriptivist about the content of the relevant claims. 
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turns out to be the best gloss of the semantics.64 The second problem, the Massive 
Error Theory Problem, remains but is much diminished. Pragmatists need not to 
insist that jurisprudents are wrong about their own judgments, as the expressivist 
must say. Instead, the pragmatist claims that some jurisprudents are wrong about 
the norms applicable to their judgments. Of course, to be wrong about the stand-
ards of correctness within a domain of discourse is a great failing, but it is clearer 
how one might become confused about this as opposed to confused about 
what judgments one is, in fact, making. The third problem, that of specifying 
the conative attitudes that jurisprudential judgments express, is totally absent 
for the pragmatist. Again, one can help oneself to whatever semantic theory offers 
the best theoretical benefits. 
5. Conclusion 
In sum, we should view bold claims about law’s nature as practical claims, that is, 
as claims to be assessed on the basis of practical reasons. Another way to say the 
same thing: we should understand these claims as ones about how to view law, 
irrespective of its true nature. This is what I have called a pragmatist under-
standing of jurisprudential language. This understanding is superior to the more 
familiar descriptive strategy because, were we to see the claims that way, we 
would understand jurisprudents as falling into epistemic error, specifically, we 
would see them as violating the norms internal to any act of description. The 
pragmatist understanding is also superior to a rival non-descriptive strategy, 
namely expressivism. I have claimed that expressivism faces grave theoretical 
problems that either fail to arise or loom less largely for pragmatism. 
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64. Of course, that means that, technically speaking, expressivism and pragmatism are compatible. 
Presenting them as mutually exclusive options is, thus, somewhat misleading. 
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